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Abstract. The DNS, as one of the oldest components of the modern
Internet, has been studied multiple times. It is a known fact that oper-
ational issues such as mis-configured name servers affect the responsive-
ness of the DNS service which could lead to delayed responses or failed
queries. One of such misconfigurations is lame delegation and this arti-
cle explains how it can be detected and also provides guidance to the
African Internet community as to whether a policy lame reverse DNS
should be enforced. It also gives an overview of the degree of lameness of
the AFRINIC reverse domains where it was found that 45% of all reverse
domains are lame.
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1 Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a core functionality of the Internet which al-
lows the translation of domain names into IP addresses i.e. from human-readable
host names to machine-interpretable addresses. The DNS has become popular
thanks to its distributed architecture which provides a very convenient way for
users to publish and propagate their DNS information to the world.
On the Internet today, besides web browsing which involves lots of DNS
queries, many applications such as content distribution through CDNs, email,
spam filtering, Voice Over IP (VOIP) and telephone number mapping (ENUM),
rely heavily on the availability of the DNS service [12]. However, when DNS was
designed in the 1980’s, engineers focused mainly on making the system scalable
rather than secure, a requirement which only came much later.
As the DNS became an indispensable function of the Internet, questions per-
taining to security and high availability became very relevant. The critical nature
of the DNS makes it prone to multiple types of attack such as cache poisoning
[11] and DDoS on DNS servers [6]. Besides the inherent security vulnerabilities,
the reliability of DNS services is also affected by different configuration errors
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as explained by Pappas et al. in their study on the impact of misconfiguration
on the robustness of the DNS [8].
In this paper, we will look at one particular type of error called lame dele-
gations on a subset of publicly DNS records, more specifically, the public DNS
records of the AFRINIC1 reverse tree.
Fig. 1. DNS tree showing reverse delegations to AFRINIC members.
2 Background
AFRINIC manages reverse delegations for the IPv4 and IPv6 address space
allocated by IANA. The resources currently managed by AFRINIC are listed on
the IANA website2. The aim of Reverse DNS entries is to allow applications on
the Internet to map an IP address to its host, as opposed to forward DNS entries
that map a domain to an IP. An example of a reverse DNS entry is a pointer
record (PTR) that maps an IP address to a hostname. PTR records are very
important for the many applications on the Internet. For example, some mail
servers would enforce the check on reverse entries to make sure the originating
IP of a incoming email transfer request is legitimate [9].
1 The African Network Information Centre (AFRINIC) is the Regional Internet Reg-
istry (RIR) for Africa and the Indian Ocean. AFRINIC allocates Internet number
resources i.e. IPv4, IPv6 and Autonomous System (AS) numbers to network opera-
tors in its constituency.
2 http://www.iana.org/numbers
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6.2.216.196.in-addr.arpa domain name pointer www.afrinic.net.
Similarly as any other Top Level Domain (TLD), the DNS reverse tree is
managed under the ARPA zone as shown in figure 1. The subdomain for the
IPv4 number space is the in-addr.arpa and ip6.arpa for IPv6. As holder of the
IANA allocated space, AFRINIC needs to host an authoritative3 DNS server
to serve the reverse zones of the space AFRINIC is currently managing. For
example, AFRINIC allocates resources from its 41/8 address block and therefore
authoritatively serves the 41.in-addr.arpa zone.
When AFRINIC now allocates an address block to a member for e.g. a
41.10/16, it also delegates the management of the 10.41.in-addr.arpa zone to
the member. As the DNS works in a hierarchy, each child needs to link back
to its parent by publishing their name servers in form of NS records. For in-
stance, the NS records for the of the servers managing the 10.41.in-addr.arpa
zone must be published in the 41.in-addr.arpa zone. Figure 2 shows how a child
zone is linked to a parent zone.
Fig. 2. NS records linking child and parent zones.
All the zones managed by AFRINIC are publicly available data and published
on the AFRINIC public repository4. By analysing this data set, it gives us an
idea of how well reverse delegations are configured in the African region.
3 An authoritative name server holds the actual records (A, AAAA, CNAME, PTR,
etc) of the zones, as opposed to a recursive server or resolver that needs to query an
authoritative name server to resolve a domain/address.
4 ftp://ftp.afrinic.net/pub/zones
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3 Definitions and related work
In this section, we will provide a definition for lame delegations and give an
insight on how other RIRs have dealt with this issue. We shall also provide some
insight on the findings of two scientific studies on DNS availability.
3.1 What is a lame delegation?
RFC1912 defines a delegation to be lame when a name server is delegated the
responsibility for providing a name service for a zone (via NS records) but it is
not actually doing it i.e. the name server is neither set up as a primary nor as
a secondary server [3]. This is a classic example of a lame delegation, however
there are some more granular cases as described in section 4 . A very common
example of lame delegation is when a network administrator recently added a
new resource record for e.g. newdomain.example.org with an NS record pointing
to ns0.mynewdnsserver.net in the parent zone, but not yet deployed any name
service on the host.
Basically, if the server does not respond to DNS queries, it is considered
lame. Lame delegation is considered as a bad practice as it increases the load on
the parent name servers and consequently increases the delay in DNS responses.
Many commercial DNS servers now have in-built mechanism to check for lame
delegations such as BIND[2]. CISCO Prime Network Registrar, which includes
a DNS server, can detect lame delegation by reporting non-matching or missing
NS records in the parent zone [4].
3.2 Lame delegation policies at other RIRs
All RIRs run authoritative name servers to serve the reverse zones of the IANA
delegated space they manage. LACNIC5, APNIC6 and ARIN7 have implemented
a ”Lame delegation policy” which enforces the DNS best practices against lame
entries. The RIPE NCC8 does not have a lame delegation policy but they have
implemented checks on their reverse DNS system precluding lame entries [10].
AFRINIC has no lame delegation policy on reverse delegation.
LACNIC periodically revises their in-addr.arpa and ip6.arpa zones and
checks for lame delegation. Their methodology is to check whether a query of a
SOA record on a selected server is returned as an authoritative response by the
server. If not, the reverse DNS entry is considered as lame and the zone operator
is contacted. LACNIC has an implemented ”Lame delegation policy” which has
help the curb the number of lame delegations and now has DNS success rate
of 96.80% [5]. Figure 3 shows how the percentage of lame delegation dropped
drastically after implementation of the lame delegation policy in 2014.
5 www.lacnic.net
6 www.apnic.net
7 www.arin.net
8 www.ripe.net
Lame delegations in Reverse DNS 5
Fig. 3. Percentage of lame delegations in LACNIC database over a year [5].
APNIC proposed a slightly different taxonomy of lame delegations in four
categories, where a delegation is considered lame if any of the following is true
(1) a listed DNS server is unreachable, (2) a listed DNS server is reachable but
not responsive on port 53, (3) a listed DNS server is reachable and responds on
port 53, but it is not able to answer for the domain, (4) a listed DNS server is
reachable and responds on port 53 but serves incorrect data for the domain [1].
3.3 Previous studies
Pappas et al. conducted passive and active measurements on a university net-
work [8]. They first analyzed DNS traffic exchanges between the university and
external websites and also implemented a specialized resolver to perform DNS
queries to a randomly selected list of destinations. They found out that DNS
configuration errors are widespread, with more than 15% of delegation being
lame, 22% of zones with inconsistency and 2% affected by cyclic dependency[7].
They classified lame delegations in three different categories, depending on the
type of error found:
– Type 1: Non responding server
– Type 2: DNS error indication
– Type 3: Non-authoritative answer
Redundancy is another important aspect of availability. A zone can authori-
tatively be served by multiple redundant name servers. DNS best practices stip-
ulate that it is preferable to have name servers, serving the same zone, spread
geographically (both in terms of location and network) [3]. Although Deccio et
al., were not specifically targeting lame delegations, they discovered that 14%
of DNS entries experience ”false redundancy”, meaning that either there is no
redundant server (different NS records pointing to the same name server) or the
supposedly redundant servers reside on the same network.
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4 Methodology
In this section, we will explain how the DNS data was collected and how lame
delegations were detected and classified.
4.1 Data collection
The AFRINIC database contains around 30000 domain objects. Each domain
object is associated with at least two name servers. For the purpose of this exper-
iment, we took the whole set of reverse domains and run the experiment against
each domain and name server (NS) tuple. A domain can have multiple NS records
and each record is considered as an entry in DNS for which we have verified its va-
lidity. All the reverse zones were obtained from ftp://ftp.afrinic.net/pub/zones.
Table 1 shows the breakdown between IPv4 and IPv6 reverse zones and gives
the total number of NS records.
Table 1. Total registered domains and corresponding number of NS entries
Type Domains NS records
IPv4 29894 72341
IPv6 196 550
Total 29986 72891
As DNS query tool, we used dig (Domain information groper) which is com-
monly found on all Unix machines. It basically performs DNS lookups and re-
turns the answers from the server that has been queried. In our case we used the
flag +norec which instructs the dig command not to query recursive servers but
instead to retrieve the answer from the name server that have been specified or
from an authoritative source.
We paid attention to three main elements in the query response: STATUS,
FLAGS and ANSWER. A query is considered as successful if the STATUS is
NOERROR, the FLAGS section contains AA9 and the ANSWER section is not
null. Table 2 gives a breakdown of the different statuses. Below is example of
a dig query and response asking for NS records of the afrinic.net domain from
ns1.afrinic.net without recursion:
$ dig NS @ns1.afrinic.net afrinic.net +norec
; <<>> DiG 9.8.3-P1 <<>> NS afrinic.net @ns1.afrinic.net +norec
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 12713
;; flags: qr aa ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 7, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 12
[...]
9 AA means Authoritative Answer
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;; Query time: 155 msec
;; SERVER: 196.216.2.1#53(196.216.2.1)
;; WHEN: Mon May 2 21:07:13 2016
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 447
Table 2. Meaning of STATUS response
Status Description
NOERROR domain exists
NXDOMAIN domain does not exists
REFUSED Server refuses to perform query
SERVFAIL something went wrong
4.2 Error classification
We run the experiment on each and every delegation from two different locations
(Mauritius and Johannesburg). A delegation is considered lame if it failed from
both sites. To simplify the representation of the results we decided to classify
them in four categories as shown in table 3. The first category is CASE#0 is the
null case which means that the NS record is OK.
We developed a simple algorithm to classify the dig results of each delegation
found on the public reverse zones of AFRINIC, as per the criteria in table 3.
The algorithm make provision for more granular details of some types of lame
delegation but in the results section, only the four main categories are taken into
account.
Query: dig @nameserver for NS record without recursion
begin
if output = any of case#1 errors
then z = CASE#1;
fi
if status = (REFUSED‖SERV FAIL‖NXDOMAIN)
then z = CASE 2;
fi
if status = NOERROR
if answer = 0
then z = CASE#2(NO ANSWER);
fi
if flag1 = AA
if flag2 = RA
then z = CASE#2(RECURSIV E);
else
then z = CASE#2;
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fi
fi
fi
if status = NOERROR
if RAflagispresent
then z = CASE#0(RECURSIV E);
else
then z = CASE#0;
fi
fi
print(z)
Table 3. Classification of delegation into different categories
Category Error response
CASE#0 NS is responsive
NS serves the domain
NS is authoritative
CASE#1 Connection timed out
Name or service not known
Connection refused
Network unreachable
Host unreachable
End of file
Communications error
Couldn’t get address
CASE#2 Response status is REFUSED or
SERVFAIL
No answer received from server i.e
ANSWER: 0
CASE#3 NS is not authoritative
5 Results and observations
5.1 Valid versus lame
We found that approximately 55% of domain registered in the AFRINIC
database do not have any issue and can be considered as valid. For the other
45% considered as lame, it means that at least one of the NS records for the
domain is actually lame. Table 4 gives the number of IPv4 and IPv6 domains
that passed the test i.e. tagged as CASE#0.
5.2 Breakdown by error type
We classified the 45% of lame delegations found into the three error categories
which are CASE#1, CASE#2 and CASE#3. From the results in table 5, we ob-
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Table 4. Percentage of lame versus non-lame domains
Type VALID % LAME % Total
IPv4 39439 54.5 32970 45.5 72409
IPv6 369 68 174 32 543
served that 75.5% are actually CASE#2 (responsive servers but not serving the
zone). Most probably, the name servers that were recorded have been decommis-
sioned by the operators. 23.5% of errors are CASE#1, meaning that the servers
are not even reachable, and finally, only 1% of faulty domains have been tagged
as CASE#3, meaning that more 99% of all servers queried are authoritative.
Table 5. Percentage of error type vs address type
Type CASE#1 CASE#2 CASE#3 Total
IPv4 7803 24941 314 32970
IPv6 19 155 0 174
Total 7822 25096 314 33144
% 23.5 75.5 1
6 Conclusion
We found that a bit chunk of reversed domains registered at AFRINIC is lame
(almost 55%) and the predominant cause of lame delegation (more than 75%) is
the CASE#2 which means that servers are proper DNS servers and are respon-
sive but they are not serving the zone as indicated by the DNS operator. One
reason which could explain this situation is that in our region where resources
are constrained, operators usually do not have redundant server for their name
servers. They would therefore register a ”bogus” name server as secondary entry
for their zones. This contributes to pollute the African reverse DNS ecosystem
and must definitely have a negative impact on query time, affecting latency of
services in general. It is therefore important for AFRINIC to fix those issues and
provide a clean and reliable DNS service to the African operators and users on
the Internet. It has become clear that to curb the number of lame delegation,
AFRINIC needs to come up with a policy or implement stringent operational
checks to (1) clear all existing lame delegations and (2) prevent any new lame
delegation to be inserted in AFRINIC’s database.
7 Future work
Lame delegation is only a subset of DNS misconfiguration. To ensure full avail-
ability, name servers should be truly redundant. By truly redundant, we means
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that primary and secondary name servers should be geographically spread and
not found on the same host and if possible not on the same network (differ-
ent AS), In the event of a routing outage and one network is unavailable, the
other network would still be reachable. This ensures full redundancy. Further-
more, it would be interesting to see where African network operators are hosting
their DNS servers. Mapping the servers by location would give us an indication
whether African operators are using local or offshore services, usually reachable
on expensive international links. Cyclic zone dependency [8] is another issue
that is less known but yet important to tackle as they create dependency loops
between DNS servers. The impact is the addition of unnecessary load on those
servers ultimately affecting availability on the overall.
References
[1] APNIC’s operational response to lame delegations.
https://www.apnic.net/manage-ip/manage-resources/reverse-dns/lame-
dns-reverse-delegation/apnics-operational-response.
[2] Albitz, P., and Liu, C. DNS And BIND 5th Ed. 2006.
[3] Barr, D. Common {DNS} Operational and Configuration Errors, 1996.
[4] CISCO. http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/net mgmt/prime/network registrar/8-
2/user/guide/CPNR 8 2 User Guide/UG16 Zon.html.
[5] LACNIC. http://lacnic.net/en/lame delegation.html.
[6] Li, W. M., Chen, L. Y., and Lei, Z. M. Alleviating the impact of
DNS DDoS attacks. In NSWCTC 2010 - The 2nd International Conference
on Networks Security, Wireless Communications and Trusted Computing
(2010), vol. 1, pp. 240–243.
[7] Pappas, V., Fa¨ltstro¨m, P., Massey, D., and Zhang, L. Distributed
DNS troubleshooting. Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on
Network troubleshooting research, theory and operations practice meet mal-
functioning reality - NetT ’04 (2004), 265.
[8] Pappas, V., Wessels, D., Massey, D., Lu, S., Terzis, A., and Zhang,
L. Impact of Configuration Errors on DNS Robustness. 275–290.
[9] Phokeer, A., and Aina, A. A survey of anti-spam mechanisms from an
RIR’s perspective. Proceedings - IST-Africa (2016).
[10] RIPE-NCC. https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/resource-
management/assisted-registry-check.
[11] Trostle, J., Van Besien, B., and Pujari, A. Protecting against DNS
cache poisoning attacks. In 2010 6th IEEE Workshop on Secure Network
Protocols, NPSec 2010 (2010), pp. 25–30.
[12] van Adrichem, N. L. M., Blenn, N., Lu´a, A. R., Wang, X., Wasif,
M., Fatturrahman, F., and Kuipers, F. A. A measurement study of
DNSSEC misconfigurations. Security Informatics 4, 1 (2015), 8.
